Native Title Act 1993: Implementation issues for resource developers by Altman, Jon
per
Native Title Act 1993: implementation
issues for resource developers
J.C. Altman
No. 88/1995
ISSN 1036-1774
ISBN 07315 1762 8
SERIES NOTE
The Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) was
established in March 1990 under an agreement between the Australian
National University (ANU) and the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC). CAEPR operates as an independent research unit
within the University's Faculty of Arts and is funded by ATSIC, the
Commonwealth Department of Social Security and the ANU. CAEPR's
principal objectives are to undertake research to:
• investigate the stimulation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
economic development and issues relating to Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander employment andunemployment;
• identify and analyse the factors affecting Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander participation in the labour force; and
• assist in the development of government strategies aimed at raising
the level of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander participation in the
labour market.
The Director of the Centre is responsible to the Vice-Chancellor of the
ANU and receives assistance in formulating the Centre's research agenda
from an Advisory Committee consisting of five senior academics
nominated by the Vice-Chancellor and four representatives nominated by
ATSIC, the Department of Employment, Education and Training and the
Department of Social Security.
CAEPR DISCUSSION PAPERS are intended as a forum for the
dissemination of refereed papers on research that falls within the CAEPR
ambit. These papers are produced for discussion and comment within the
research community and Aboriginal affairs policy arena. Many are
subsequently published in academic journals. Copies of discussion papers
can be purchased from the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research, Faculty of Arts, Australian National University, Canberra ACT
0200. Ph (06) 279 8211 Fax (06) 249 2789.
As with all CAEPR publications, the views expressed
in this DISCUSSION PAPER are those of the author(s)
and do not reflect an official CAEPR position.
Professor Jon Airman
Director, CAEPR
Australian National University
ABSTRACT
There is little documented evidence that the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA)
hampers mineral, oil and gas exploration and production because few
genuine attempts have been made to work within the existing framework.
From a public policy perspective and utilising an economics framework,
this paper discusses the rationale and associated risks of the strategy of
interested parties in challenging the effectiveness of the NTA. The analysis
focuses on statutory provisions for a future acts regime and the right of
negotiation under the NTA; provisions with potential to reduce transaction
costs and enhance certainty are outlined. It is suggested that, rather than
playing within the rules established under the NTA, most parties are
focused on changing the rules. It is possible, however, to operate within the
existing framework and extract gains from trade; the Mt Todd Agreement
is discussed as an example. In conclusion it is argued that while the rules
might need some alteration, and specific recommendations are made,
legislative amendment will require the concurrence of all parties.
Continued strategic behaviour, and associated avoidance behaviour by
resource developers, is a high risk strategy that might result in net long-
term losses for all parties.
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Foreword
Between March and May 1995 the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research (CAEPR) sponsored a thematic seminar series titled 'Policy
Aspects of Native Title'. The following eight seminars were presented:
• 'Relative allocative efficiency of the Native Title Act 1993 and the
Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976' by Siobahn McKenna (March).
• 'Resource development agreements on Aboriginal land in the 1990s:
features and trends' by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh (March).
• 'Negotiations between Aboriginal communities and Mining
companies: structures and process' by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh (April).
• Tourism enterprise and native title: the Tjapukai Dance Theatre,
Cairns' by Julie Finlayson (April).
• 'Funding native title claims: establishing equitable procedures' by Jon
Altman and Diane Smith (April).
• 'Native title and land management' by Elspeth Young and Helen Ross
(April).
• 'Native Title Act 1993: latest developments and implementation issues
for resource developers' by Jon Altman(May).
• 'Native title and regional agreements: the Kimberley case' by Patrick
Sullivan (May).
Five of these seminars have now been revised into CAEPR Discussion
Papers Nos 85-89. Of the others, Siobahn McKenna's seminar was
published earlier as CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 79 and Jon Altman and
Diane Smith's seminar was published as 'Funding Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander Representative Bodies under the Native Title Act 1993',
(Issues Paper No. 8, Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title, Native
Titles Research Unit, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Studies, Canberra).
Owing to the pressing public policy significance of the issues addressed in
this series, these discussion papers are intentionallyexploratory and aim to
disseminate information to a wider audience than that able to attend the
seminars at the Australian NationalUniversity.
Jon Altman
Series Editor
July 1995
The High Court's Native Title decision of 1992 is now nearly three years
old; it took 18 months for the Native Title Act 1993 (NTA) to be
formulated and passed and a further 15 months elapsed before the High
Court endorsed its constitutional validity. The latest significant
development in the native title saga is that native title as a legitimate form
of land ownership has been affirmed. To continue to challenge this law,
while possible, would certainly appear futile, and ultimately counter-
productive. However, this seems to be the precise strategy being pursued
by a number of interested parties and it is the rationale, and associated risks
of such a strategy, that are the central theme of this paper.
Implementation issues are examined here from a public policy perspective
using an economics framework. The paper begins by outlining the
analytical framework to be used and identifying, by way of background,
the range of interests involved. The focus of the analysis is very much on
future acts, and the right of negotiation, rather than on past acts and
validation. Hence the NTA's future acts regime is described in some detail,
with an emphasis on statutory provisions aimed at minimising delay and
providing certainty. Next, four features of the NTA that appear to have the
potentiality to generate transactions costs and reduce certainty are outlined.
Paradoxically, three of the four were initially perceived as wins to resource
developers in the lead-up to passage of the NTA. Three broad scenarios are
then examined. First, it is suggested that rather than playing within the
rules (the NTA), most parties are focusing excessively on getting the rules
changed (amending the legislation). Second, it is argued that potential
exists to work within the existing NTA framework and extract gains from
trade. It is argued in conclusion that while the rules might require some
change, legislative amendment will require the concurrence of all parties.
In the meantime, continued strategic behaviour, and associated avoidance
behaviour by resource developers, is a high risk strategy that might result
in net long-term losses for mining and petroleum industries.
Analytical framework
An independent academic commentator needs to ground an argument
within an analytical framework that extends beyond mere opinion. The
broad framework used here is a standard economic framework, informed
by the fundamental theorems of welfare economics. It is recognised, for
example, that for optimal outcomes to occur under the existing statutory
framework (or under a different 'amended' framework) transactions costs
must be minimised (Coase 1960) so that the two key parties, in this case
resource developers (grantee parties in the NTA) and native titleholders or
claimants, can be free to negotiate a division of rents that is acceptable to
both. This is the path to exploration, mining and economic development.
Of course, if valuation of not mining for native title holders exceeds the
potential financial rewards to them from mining, then non-mining will,
according to conventional welfare economics, be the optimal outcome. The
abstract model, as such, suggests that there are two parties and that neither
engage in strategic behaviour. This term is used in the economic property
rights sense referring to the revealing of false valuations in the short-term
anticipating net future long-term gain (see McKenna 1995).
The analysis though is not located in an abstract Coasian world: rather it is
heavily qualified by the realpolitik behaviour of a range of interest groups
and interested parties. Even a gross simplification suggests that there is
enormous diversity among the two main interest groups, resource
developers and indigenous parties, and that both are currently engaging in
strategic behaviour. What is even more significant, and requires the
grounding of the analysis in a version of political economy or public
choice theory, is that governments (in all their diversity) are not neutral
arbiters and State and Territory governments in particular are also
participating in strategic behaviour with the primary objective of having
the NTA amended.
The three broad groups that are identified as actors in this analysis can be
typified as indigenous parties, resource developers and governments.
While it is essential to greatly simplify complexity, it is equallyworthwhile
to highlight not only the diversity that exists within each of these
categories, but also broad similarities in objectives.
Indigenous parties
A feature of the indigenous Australian polity is its diversity, especially
between geographic regions; another feature of such traditionally small-
scale societies is a propensity for fragmentation. The Mabo High Court
judgment and subsequent native title legislation increases both diversity
and potential to political fragmentation. On top of statutory land rights
regimes and associated property rights established in most States and
Territories, a new native title regime is superimposed. Indigenous
Australians with interests in land (besides those who own land under
freehold title), now include groups whose native title in land might be
recognised and groups whose native title has been extinguished.
Furthermore there is a possibility that limited native title might be
recognised to co-exist with commercial pastoral leasehold interests. Native
title parties might be variably represented by Representative Bodies (many
of which are also statutory or non-statutory land councils), non-
representative bodies (that is, bodies not determined as representative by
the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Affairs), prescribed bodies corporate and as individuals. It is assumed in
the context of the economics framework used here that indigenous parties
are rent maximisers: in most cases this will mean that they are pro-
development, but in some cases indigenous interests will be maximised by
stopping development.
Resource developers
Resource developers are not as diverse as indigenous parties, but neither
are they as homogeneous as key industry lobby groups like the Minerals
Council of Australia (formerly the Australian Mining Industry Council
(AMIQ) and the Chamber of Mines and Energy of Western Australia
present them. Resource developers fall into a number of categories with
some cross-cutting similarities. A key distinction, in the native title
context, can be drawn between the mining industry and the petroleum
industry. One difference is that with the former, exploration and mining are
distinct phases often differentiated in mining law: companies are issued
exploration licences in contrast to mining leases. With the latter,
exploration is rarely differentiated from production. Another difference is
that petroleum exploration and production has a low environmental impact,
especially compared to bulk sampling exploration and open-cut mineral
production. This will potentially affect compensation payments. A final
issue is that approximately 90 per cent of oil and gas production in
Australia occurs offshore, where native title rights are currently less clearly
recognised, in marked contrast to mining which mainly occurs onshore (see
Vickery 1995).
Another important distinction can be made between three categories of
resource developers: big and small companies and those who specialise in
mineral exploration. Big companies typically have multinational interests
and have significant stakes in the global mining industry. From Australia's
perspective, they can easily go offshore, aim to minimise sovereign risk,
seek to maximise rate of return on investors' dollars and spread their
exploration, mining and investment portfolios. Small companies on the
other hand operate primarily domestically; exploration specialists similarly
operate locally and can be extremely small.
In behavioural terms, it is self-evident that the options of smaller
companies are far more circumscribed that those of larger companies: they
must truck and barter with all land holders, including native title parties, or
fail. For a time, risk minimisation will result in avoidance of land,
especially unalienated Crown land, where native title might be recognised,
but in the longer-term exploration activity must extend beyond the 29 per
cent of Australia that is freehold land. An aspect of the future acts regime
and the unexpedited right to negotiate (RTN) framework in the NTA seems
to inadvertently distinguish between big and small companies: private
bargaining between resource developers and native title parties under s.33
allows rent-sharing. However, if agreement cannot be reached within
specified time frames (four months for exploration, six months for mining)
then an arbitral body must determine if the act may proceed and assess
compensation. However, calculation of compensation at this stage cannot
consider rent-sharing as a possibility (s.37(2)). Under such circumstances it
is likely that the incentive for small companies will be to avoid delay,
while the incentive to large companies will be to seek arbitration.
McKenna has argued that with a bilateral monopoly and two parties
behaving strategically, arbitration (a liability rule) might generate greater
allocative efficiency than private bargaining (McKenna 1995).
Governments
The Commonwealth government is the only party that is committed to
stand by the NTA, a statutory framework that it established. The role of
State and Territory governments looms large though, because despite the
High Court decision of 16 March 1995 that affirmed the constitutional
validity of the Commonwealth's NTA, it is this level of government that
has ultimate authority over land management issues.
Standard economics suggests that governments should not be interested
parties and that their role should be limited to that of neutral arbiters that
establish statutory regimes for optimal efficiency, taking equity
considerations into account, and then take a back seat. However, despite
the fact that almost all States and Territories have passed complementary
legislation that validates past acts, none have as yet established a future
acts regime. An alternative view from political theory of more relevance
here might be that governments are always interested parties operating as
defenders of the public interest.
Even here though there is enormous diversity. It is generally unchallenged
that Western Australia is most affected by the NTA. This is partly because
it is the only mainland State without statutory land rights. But it is also
because most of Australia's unalienated Crown land (90 per cent) over
which native title is least likely to be extinguished is in this State. It is no
doubt concerned that native title, and the associated RTN, will be
recognised over much of the State. Furthermore, it is the State where most
mineral exploration in Australia is undertaken as has been amply
documented by the Chamber of Mines and Energy of Western Australia
(1994). The Western Australian Government is vehemently opposed to the
NTA; it challenged its validity in the High Court and lost and it now seems
committed to demonstrate the NTA's unworkability by clogging the
Commonwealth's National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) with exploration
proposals, rather than setting up a State future acts regime as allowed under
s.43 of the NTA. Similarly, the former Fahey Government in New South
Wales was unwilling to work within the NTA's framework being the only
party not to ratify a number of mediated settlements. The Northern
Territory Government is the latest to oppose the NTA, partly in protest at
the NNTT's registration of a native title claim over parts of Alice Springs,
but more significantly because of concern about excessive Commonwealth
powers in relation to land management issues. It is likely that nearly 50 per
cent of the Northern Territory will be Aboriginal land under the auspices of
the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (NT Land
Rights Act) with statutory provision for traditional owners to veto
exploration and mining over this land. It is possible that if native title is
recognised as extant over pastoral leasehold land, resource development on
much of the remainder of the Northern Territory will be subject to a right
of negotiation.
The statutory future acts regime: key features
The principal aim of the NTA in relation to resource development is to
validate all past acts; to provide a right of renewal for all existing validated
mining leases; and to ensure that if compensation is required for invalid
past acts then miners are indemnified by government. These are all big and
important wins for the mining and petroleum industries; it was, after all,
industry concerns about invalidity that were to a great extent the precursor
to government legislative action on the High Court judgment in Mabo No.
2. Furthermore, the NTA makes it quite clear that exploration and mining
are permissible future acts because both are acts that can occur on private
(freehold) land. The only clear win for indigenous interests in the NTA is
that most future acts that occur on land where native title is, or may be,
determined is subject to a RTN, unless subject to an exclusion (s.26).
The Commonwealth has established a minimum benchmark regime for
future acts but this, as will be shown below, is a far from perfect regime
especially in terms of clarity of property rights. Two initial practical
problems exist. Commonsense suggests that for the NTA to work
effectively, the Australian continent needs to be mapped into those parts
where native title continues to exist and those parts where it is
extinguished. Extinguishment has occurred over all freehold land; the
situation over other lands, especially pastoral leasehold where a statutory
reservation (that recognises a form of native title) is in place, but also
national parks and even unalienated Crown land that might have been
previously alienated (as in the Waanyi claim) remains unclear. Current
claims before the NNTT and test cases before Federal and High Courts will
clarify most these uncertainties. The key practical problem here is not that
exploration and mining might be impermissible future acts, but rather that
resource developers need to identify native title holders or claimants with
whom to negotiate (AMIC 1994). If this is a costly process, either in terms
of time or dollars, then transactions costs will be deemed high. It is clear
that mapping the Australian continent to facilitate negotiation with
certainty will take many years.
The issue of the cost of searching for parties with whom to negotiate falls
squarely within Coase's definition of transactions costs (Coase 1960). But
there are a range of mechanisms in the NTA's future acts regime that seek
to either limit delays associated with negotiation or to provide bypass
options.
The former broad approach is incorporated in RTN provisions (s.26) and a
requirement for government to notify native title parties, as well as others,
about proposed future acts to make them valid (s.28, s.30). Time frames
are stipulated in the NTA for private bargaining (four months for
exploration, six months for mining) and if this fails, for arbitration and
mediation (similar time frames again). If arbitration fails, options exist for
ministerial override within a further two months. As noted above, for
native title parties, private bargaining will invariably be preferable to
arbitration from a financial incentives perspective owing to the existence of
a no rent-sharing proviso at s.37(2).
The latter broad approach is evident in a number of options. Of great
potential significance is provision in the NTA that certain future acts may
be excluded from the RTN under s.26(4) if the Commonwealth Minister is
assured that the Act will have minimal effect on any native title concerned,
that Representative Bodies and the public have been notified, submissions
have been invited and that, if the exclusion is determined, native title
parties are consulted about access. It is generally recognised that it was the
Commonwealth's intent that exploration tenures be excluded from the RTN
(Keating 1993: 2880) and that implementing exclusion provisions are
fundamental to the workability of the NTA's future acts regime. Other
provisions include the option for developers to make non-claimant
applications to the NNTT (s.24) with the aim of either having a
determination that native title claimants are absent or alternatively 'flushing
out' claimants within two months. Notification procedures also have an
expedited procedures option (s.29(4) and s.32) when the government is
sure that a permissible future act will have limited impact on indigenous
communities. There is also the option to undertake low impact future acts
(s.234) while awaiting determination, although it is unclear what
exploration activity might fall into this category. Of crucial importance is
the automatic renewal of existing interests (s.25) and stipulation that
negotiations may not be re-opened (s.40).
Perceived wins and losses for resource developers and their
consequences
Utilising an economics framework and the proposed future acts regime
sketched out above, four key issues loom large. Interestingly,three of these
were initially regarded in negotiations prior to passage of the NTA as wins
for resource developers (and losses for indigenous interests), but now
appear to have negative impacts; the last is generally interpreted as a loss
for resource developers (and a win for indigenous interests).
The right to negotiate
The mining industry via AMIC fought hard to ensure that the right to veto
exploration in the NT Land Rights Act was not incorporated into the NTA.
This right of veto has been accurately depicted by the Industry
Commission (1C) as a de facto mineral right (1C 1991). Interestingly
though, the 1C argued persuasively, in somewhat apolitical economic
terms, that this de facto mineral right was a very murky property right that
should be replaced with de jure mineral ownership (that is, full indigenous
mineral ownership). The 1C case was that clearer property rights in
minerals would result in efficiency gains as resource developers and
Aboriginal traditional owners could bargain more directly and reveal their
'market valuations' more accurately. In 1993, indigenous interests
reluctantly acquiesced and allowed the replacement of a right of veto with
the far less clear property right inherent in the RTN (Altman 1994a). It was
the mistaken view of the mining lobby that the NT Land Rights Act was
operating suboptimally because of the right of veto. It was in fact operating
suboptimally because of legal uncertainty about the link between approvals
to allow exploration and approvals to allow mining (conjunctive versus
disjunctive agreements) and an unwillingness on the part of all parties to
meet negotiation deadlines stipulated in statute (Altman 1994b). If the
problem with the NT Land Rights Act can be typified as being linked to
unclear property rights in minerals, then these rights are even less clearly
defined in the NTA: what was perceived as a win for resource developers
may in fact end up as a loss.
Limited rent sharing provisions
The NT Land Rights Act provides indigenous interests with an equivalent,
appropriated from consolidated revenue, to the statutory royalties raised
from mining or oil and gas production. This provision was based on an
historical precedent dating back to 1952 (see Altman 1993). Additional
payments above statutory limits could also be negotiated and have been
evident in all mining agreements since passage of land rights legislation.
This option to share rents is linked to the existence of the right of veto. The
1C recommended that de jure mineral rights should also allow continued
payment of royalties; however, it was recommended that a larger
proportion of statutory royalties should be paid to traditional owners,
beyond the 30 per cent guaranteed by statute to those in 'areas affected' by
resource development projects.
The NTA goes part way to rectifying a problem identified in the NT Land
Rights Act by the 1C; where rents or compensation is payable it goes
directly to native title holders (1C 1991). Hence appropriate incentives are
in place for native title parties to benefit directly from resource
development and consequently to be pro-development. However, the
resource developers argued successfully that statutory royalty equivalents
should not be paid to native title parties, even though such payments were
at zero net cost to them. The rent sharing possible in the NTA under s.33
only refers to 'negotiated' payments, typically in the limited range of a
royalty of 1.5 to 3.0 per cent ad valorem in the Northern Territory. While
the absence of statutory royalty equivalent payments in the NTA was again
perceived as a win to resource developers, perhaps because it appeared to
break a nexus between interest in land and mineral rights, it nevertheless
provides limited incentive for native title parties to be pro-development.
State governments may have played a crucial part in this too: the payment
of royalty equivalents from consolidated revenue would have required a
degree of transparency in royalty revenue-raising effort. There is historical
evidence that States and Territories can behave strategically here: because
they are fundamentally pro-development, they are sometimes willing to
forego royalty revenue and allow mining company super-profits to
expedite mining, while seeking economic growth mainly from multiplier
effects. Both resource developers and State governments were probably
keen to maintain their room to manoeuvre with each other in relation to
royalty concessions; this would have been eroded by statutory royalty
sharing arrangements in the NTA.
Absence of statutory bodies with whom to negotiate
In negotiations about native title, both State governments (especially
Queensland) and resource developers were adamant that there should be no
mandatory requirements in the NTA to negotiate with native title parties
via stipulated statutory bodies. Again there was a perception, this time
supported by the 1C, that resource developers and native title parties should
be able to strike private deals without involving intermediary statutory
bodies like land councils (1C 1991). Again there was a misguided
perception that land council involvement exacerbated inefficiencies in the
NT Land Rights Act. Keating made it clear that Representative Bodies
would not operate as monopolies, with implied associated inefficiencies
(Keating 1993: 2881). McKenna identifies the absence of mandatory
functions for Representative Bodies as a potential source of increased
efficiency from the NTA compared with the NT Land Rights Act
(McKenna 1995).
This apparent win for both resource developers and the States is also likely
to generate costs and inefficiencies. The NTA gives Representative Bodies
a discretionary role in representing native title parties (s.203); conversely,
prescribed bodies corporate can represent themselves or be represented by
'non-representative1 or undetermined bodies. It appears that in the
formulation of the NTA, there was too much concern about the potential
political power of land councils and too little with the inherent potential
efficiencies of a one-stop shop (or regulatory monopoly) for negotiations.
Part of the problem here has been an overemphasis on the activities of the
two major Northern Territory land councils without due recognition being
given to their independent funding base (from statutory royalty
equivalents); the likely diminution of their national political profile with
the establishment of numerous additional Representative Bodies; and a
poor understanding of the potential for disputation over land matters in
Aboriginal societies (Edmunds 1995).
There appears to be a strong public goods argument that well-funded
Representative Bodies with large jurisdictions, mandatory statutory or
regulatory powers and sufficient organisational scale may be preferable to
a plethora of smaller, and supposedly leaner and more competitive,
'representative' bodies with limited staff resources (Altman and Smith
1995). The flexibility in statute is evident in the potential for overlapping
geographic representative jurisdictions, but this too can have enormous
potential costs in terms of efficiency. The antipathy of resource developers
to the Northern Territory land councils system and principled stances on
flexibility and competition has a cost. If certainty, especially in negotiated
contracts, is important then it seems that statutory bodies with mandatory
functions provide a means to deliver such certainty. This though does not
mean that native title parties cannot participate directly in the negotiation
process. Increasingly, the RTN is being identified as the problem rather
than the absence of an efficient framework for negotiation. The potential
for Representative Bodies to provide certainty is being overlooked. As
French notes, model agreements between resource developers and
Representative Bodies may speed up negotiations (French 1995: 25).
Recognition of claimant rights
The extension of the RTN to registered native title claimants (s.30), as
distinct from determined native title holders, can be seen as a win for
native title parties, and a potential loss to resource developers. In terms of
transactions costs, there is a potential for some delay here. But it should be
noted that if compensation or rent-sharing payments are negotiated with
claimants, such moneys must be held in trust (s.52) until a determination is
made. Transactions costs might be more than offset here with future risk
minimisation benefits. In terms of certainty, this requirement reduces the
risk for resource developers of potential future invalidity or of potential
requirement to make compensation payments that will not be reimbursed
by government.
Shifting the goalposts before the match begins: strategic behaviour
and associated risks
The regulatory framework created by the NTA is not perfect and there are
some inherent delays, intentionally established in law, to provide an
opportunity for negotiation with native title parties. To some extent
increased transactions costs are inevitable as they would be if other extant
forms of land ownership over unalienated Crown land, be it freehold or
leasehold, were suddenly recognised. There is little documented evidence
that the NTA does hamper exploration, partly because few genuine
attempts have been made to work within the existing legislative framework
(AMIC 1994). Recent data indicates that only a small number of native
title claims, non-claimant applications and test cases have been heard: both
interest groups and State and Territory governments are continuing to
cautiously await the establishment of precedents (see Altman and Smith
1995).
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Such avoidance behaviour and risk minimisation on the part of resource
developers is understandable, but strategic behaviour that exaggerates
potential transactions costs and uncertainty could have longer-term costs.
First, there is a real possibility that the strategic behaviour itself will be
increasingly recognised, and documented, as the generator of transactions
costs. In short, it may not be the rules that are creating transactions costs,
but the refusal to play by them. Second, there is a distinct possibility that
resource developers will be seen as anti-native title rather than opponents
of the statute's operations. It is noteworthy in this regard that industry
statements are increasingly emphasising a pro-native title stance, but with
continual concern about the workability of the Commonwealth's statutory
framework (see Ewing 1994; Chamber of Mines and Energy of Western
Australia Inc. 1994; Davies 1995; Fussell 1995). Third, there is a
possibility that delays in negotiation, under the guise of strategic
behaviour, will have real longer-term costs. Because past acts have been
validated and renewals guaranteed, there is no evident downturn in
exploration and mining since the Mabo High Court judgment (AMIC
1994). But even normal processing of exploration licence applications has
a long lead time, varying from one to three years between States. If
exploration licences are not processed then there is a distinct possibility
that there will be a hiatus in resource development in the future: mining
and, to a lesser degree the petroleum industry (and ultimately the
Australian economy) will suffer, but it is unclear if it is the NTA that will
be at fault. The costs of this strategic behaviour will be most acutely felt by
small exploration and mining interests unless they move quickly to
negotiate with native title parties under the NTA's future acts regime; large
companies will be at greater liberty to shift their focus offshore.
It is not just resource developers that are behaving strategically. There is a
growing recognition among indigenous interests that the potential financial
returns from NTA in terms of rent sharing is far less significant than
benchmarks established by land rights law, especially in the Northern
Territory. Hence native title parties also have a vested interest in
demonstrating that the existing statutory future acts regime is unworkable,
even though in reality the cards are stacked against them given the
potential financial costs of delay for native title parties.
State Governments too are behaving strategically. For example, the
Western Australian Court Government established its own native title
statute that was ruled as discriminatory and unacceptable by the High
Court. Now it is threatening to overload the NNTT with thousands of non-
claimant applications to make the existing framework administratively
unworkable and in need of major amendment. The risks for State
governments in such strategic behaviour has analogies with those for
miners: there is a distinct possibility that it will not be the NTA that is
creating uncertainty, but ongoing challenges. Such a strategy will be
expensive in terms of taxpayer dollars and possibly politically unpopular.
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There are risks of real opportunity costs in terms of forgone development,
at the State level, again with associated political costs. From the resource
developers perspective it is probably good strategy to avoid
Commonwealth/State disputation, rather than forming alliances with the
States. All parties need to adjust to the idea of native title and playing by
the rules.
Working within/with the existing system or how to play by the rules
and extract gains from trade
An alternative strategy to continual attempts to challenge existing law, is to
work within it and establish bona fides. Unfortunately, owing to the
strategic behaviour of all parties, there are few examples of agreements
struck between miners and indigenous interests since the passage of the
NTA.
One agreement that has been discussed in some detail elsewhere that was
completed in 1993 is, however, particularly instructive (see Altman
1994a). The agreement between Zapopan and the Jawoyn Association for
gold mining at Mt Todd demonstrated that if the two key parties,
indigenous interests and resource developers, are willing to negotiate, then
governments (in this case the Commonwealth and the Northern Territory
Government) will be willing to both underwrite development and expedite
administrative arrangements to achieve broader policy objectives. It is also
noteworthy that the Northern Land Council (now also a determined
Representative Body) was a party to this Agreement.
The Mt Todd case is replete with lessons for resource developers that can
be operationalised under the NTA's future acts regime. It indicates that if
resource developers, in this case a small company Zapopan, are willing to
truck and barter, to be creative and proactive and to get the process right,
then outcomes in the form of successful and profitable ventures will occur.
What is especially pertinent in the Mt Todd case is how Zapopan was able
to look after its own interests by drawing in government resources and
indigenous equity participation. It has also been provided with commercial
certainty by the Northern Land Council which indicates that rather than
oppose or undermine Representative Bodies, resource developers could
utilise these bodies to undertake the arduous task of identifying appropriate
native title parties. Mt Todd demonstrates how the stakeholder model can
operate and how equity participation by indigenous interests has the
potential to draw them into resource development projects as active
participants. It ultimately illustrates how a small resource developer was
able to play by the rules, admittedly new rules that require a change of
mind-set, and extract significant gains from trade rather than losses from
standoffs, delays and potential legal proceedings.
It is not only resource developers who need to play by the rules to extract
gains from trade: indigenous parties and governments must also play their
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part. As intimated above native title parties are also behaving strategically,
but in the short-term it may be preferable for them to rent seek using the
limited leverage provided by the RTN in the NTA rather than assume
higher rents will be available in the longer-term. Members of the Jawoyn
Association have already benefited considerably from the Mt Todd
Agreement, initially from concessions that were extracted from
government than from Zapopan, but more recently from employment at the
mine.
State governments too have a range of options under the existing statutory
framework. S.43 of the NTA allows State governments to establish
credible alternative future acts regimes that are suited to particular regional
requirements. Such alternatives must use the NTA as a minimum
benchmark, but there is potential to use existing State institutions to
facilitate negotiation between resource developers and native title parties.
Of especial potential significance is the option to establish complementary
State future acts regimes with exclusions. Much of the practical problem
with implementing an exclusions regime within the NTA has been
variability in mining statutes between States. Tailor-made alternative
arrangements, dovetailed with amendments to mining and energy laws
could greatly expedite development. For example, different forms of
exploration could be defined, with some being eligible for exclusion from
the RTN. Coordinated and systematised time frames under State mining
statute and State future act arrangements could see the concurrent
lodgement of exploration licence applications with mines departments, and
non-claimant applications with State-based tribunals resulting in a far
quicker approval turn around time. Like resource developers, State
governments need to seek creative solutions to a new form of land tenure.
The future: how to set up rules that please all parties and maximise
efficiency while moving beyond the meta-game
The economics framework used in this paper and the analysis of both the
current and potential political strategies of all parties indicates that there
are elements of the NTA's future acts regime that need to be recast. Some
major changes that need to be considered, in my opinion, are as follows.
First, there is a need for property rights on land that might have native title
over it recognised to be more clearly defined. This will allow more direct
bargaining between developers and native title parties, clearer signals
about rent sharing and valuations and greater incentives to native title
parties to allow mining. The simplest mechanism available to achieve this
objective is to introduce a once-only right to veto mining or petroleum
production. Tradeoffs will be needed here. For example, in exchange for
such better defined property rights, exclusions could be applied to all
exploration, bar bulk sampling. Recourse to arbitration could remain if
parties cannot come to private agreement, but s.37(2) of the NTA should
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be deleted so that an arbitral body can consider rent sharing as part of a
compensation package. Such a measure is essential to ensure a level
playing field in negotiations between resource developers and native title
parties especially if native title parties are pro-development, as implied by
rent-seeking behaviour.
A second alternative proposal is that native title parties are provided with
either a share or full access to the equivalent of statutory royalties. This
equivalent could either be stipulated as a fixed figure in statute or else
could be the full equivalent of any royalties paid with respect to projects on
land held under native title. Each option has a risk for native title parties.
The former option offers greater certainty, but potentially lower returns;
the latter offers less certainty, especially if State governments provide
royalty concessions to resource developers. These options will be costless
to companies, yet will provide incentives to native title parties to allow
development. Equivalents could be paid either by the Commonwealth or on
a shared basis with the States. If non-negotiable financial returns from
mining are stipulated in the NTA, native title parties and miners will be
discouraged from behaving strategically and only non-financial terms and
conditions like protection of sacred sites and access will be open for
negotiation.
Third, from a resource development perspective, it is important that
Representative Bodies are established as regulatory monopolies with
statutory functions that include identification of parties with whom to
negotiate. One of the key lessons from the operations of the NT Land
Rights Act is that while industry lobby groups often articulate a preference
to deal with traditional owners direct, individual companies prefer the
certainty of dealing with statutory authorities. There is a strong public
goods argument for monopolistic Representative Bodies, but this does not
preclude direct bargaining between native title parties and resource
developers. The greater issue with Representative Bodies for government
is how their functions will articulate with those of other regional
organisations like statutory and non-statutory land councils and, more
significantly, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission regional
councils.
The analysis here suggests that currently all parties are engaged in strategic
behaviour, participating in a meta-game. One of the key lessons that can be
learnt from the nearly 20 years experience with the NT Land Rights Act is
that statutory frameworks can operate suboptimally for years without any
parties (including the Commonwealth Government) having the incentives
or power to institute appropriate amendments (Altman 1994b). To institute
change requires the mobilisation of all key stakeholders, including the
Commonwealth. In my view the only means to ensure modification of the
NTA is to work within the existing framework to demonstrate what is
actually going wrong and then to seek a concurrence of diverse views
about what needs to be changed for the benefit of all parties.
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